“Years in Iraq change U.S. military’s understanding of war” I read this story in today’s Washington Post. I’d like to share it (with comment) with you. It’s well written and presents a balanced view of what is surely a highly
controversial topic.

Early in the article, the author raises the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) argument, which has received very shallow analysis by the media. Here is my take on it.

As Americans we tend to see things as black or white, something that is an outgrowth from the openness in our society. In reality, they are different shades of gray. So, our expectations – much of which were set by the media – when we entered Baghdad, were that we would find and secure the Iraqi “WMD store”, in the middle of a town square, like a Wal-Mart in Paducah, Kentucky. When that did not occur, we immediately began to question the decision to invade Iraq – making preposterous statements and drawing conclusions, like the George Bush revenge theory.

To make matters worse, our HUMINT (Human Intelligence) was virtually no existent. Lacking reliable intelligence on the Iraqi WMD program, the intelligence community, Congress and the Executive Branch had to make the assumption that Saddam Hussein had access to and the willingness to use WMDs. That assumption is reasonably supported by Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in the North and against Iran.

There was never a concern that Iraqi Republican Guards would parachute into Times Square and employ  WMDs to take back the city from the hookers. The real concern – one that I feel is valid – is that via internal corruption or sectarian loyalties chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be made available to AlQaeda and Associates who would then, using an expansive terrorist network, smuggle them into the United States and employ them at will. This was the risk and I believe the thought process driving the decision to go into Iraq.

Lastly, and then I’ll get off my soap box.

Something that I tend to see quite a lot of – with increasing regularity – are the impassioned discussions about the lives lost. I’d like you to look at them in a slightly different light. But, first i want you to know that I’ve served for about twelve years, Navy and Army NG. Having said that, I have no illusions about what a war can cost, and having lost 1 man or woman in  hostile action in Iraq is too much. However, I am bothered by the fact that we use casualty statistics to accentuate “the great mistake” of our actions, all of which are designed to place blame on others, or simply set themselves up as luminaries. So, I’d like to show you some figures so that you can place things in your own perspective.

As of 21 October 2011, the United States has suffered 3,525 KIA in 9 years of military operations in Iraq. Let’s divide that figure by 9 to get an annual rate of 391.7 KIA per year. In the United States our national death rate is 803.6 deaths per year, per 100,000 population.

Draw your own conclusions. But, let me express what this analysis does for me!

If fills me with great pride. Pride in the men and women who served and in their leadership. That statistic stands as a monument to their courage and their effectiveness. It says to me that perhaps we should be celebrating their lives, successes and contributions.